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Abstract
Music piracy through the Internet remains a concern for many copyright holders in the United
States. To determine the efficiency of current music copyright law and which changes should be
implemented to improve it, several factors were taken into account: the legal policies historically
and currently in place to protect music copyrights, a survey of court cases related to peer-to-peer
file sharing, and copyright holders’ viewpoints on music piracy. Cohesively, these factors
support a need for changes in current copyright law and in how music piracy is currently
handled. These changes might take the form of reform to the AHRA and/or to the Fair Use
Doctrine, a tax on certain music-related products, legalizing free downloading and sharing for
noncommercial purposes, informing music consumers more accurately about different aspects of
music piracy, and/or utilizing blockchain technology. Implementation of any of these measures
or others to improve music copyright law and reduce music piracy requires participation from all
those who are affected by music piracy and copyrights.
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Does Digital Music Piracy Beget A Revitalization of Copyright Law?
The first 19 years of the 21st century have seen a powerful boom in the expansion and
innovation of technology certainly for the sake of improving daily life, but also, importantly, for
the sake of meeting increasingly higher standards and demands for entertainment. Arguably in
the music industry, the most significant development is increased facility in music streaming and
sharing through the Internet. Music sharing programs have completely revolutionized how
people instantaneously listen to music and view music videos. Inevitably, in this Digital Age
where music is simply one click and swipe away, this growth in the capability for fast streaming
and sharing has resulted in individuals partaking in illegal music practices. Though programs like
YouTube, Spotify, and Pandora offer millions of songs subscribers can listen to, the programs are
not without their drawbacks. All three include advertisements, which, while short, quickly
become annoying due to their frequency and repetitiveness. YouTube users can’t listen to songs
while not on the application on their phones, which is the device most people regularly use to
listen to music. Spotify and Pandora only allow users to skip a certain amount of songs per day
and users are not allowed to play a specific song at once, but have to wait until the song comes
up on the shuffled album the song is in, which may not happen for a while or, in the case of
Pandora, at all.
Granted, all three programs include paid subscription options in which these issues
magically disappear and users can listen to whichever music they want to their heart’s content.
However, many individuals simply don’t want to pay $10 and up a month to receive these
subscription benefits when a free and easy alternative is readily available (McIntyre, 2017). The
fact that this free and easy option is illegal certainly hasn’t been a deterrent and illegal music
downloading programs have become a dime a dozen. A quick Google search of ‘YouTube to
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MP3 converter’ yielded eight different results just on the first page and the process is simple and
straightforward. Additionally, there are generally no repercussions for the individuals who
download the music nor for sharing it. When the alternative is forking up $10 or more a month,
the practice of illegal music sharing and downloading suddenly becomes extremely appealing.
Copyright holders’ attempts to stem the flow of music piracy just by warning people against
music piracy and attacking the developers of music piracy programs have not proven fruitful, as
will be demonstrated through a later discussion of court cases. The burden of either stopping
illegal music sharing or ameliorating its effects on the music industry should not be placed on
music consumers as it has been typically, but rather on musicians, record companies, and on the
system which was created to protect musicians’ rights: copyright law.
This paper represents an endeavor to cover the continuous quarrel between copyright law
and copyright infringers. The first part of the paper is a brief history of copyright law pertaining
to music protection. Next, there will be a review of court cases focusing on peer-to-peer digital
networks1 for music piracy that highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of current copyright
laws. Wrapping up the review will be an account of how different artists feel about copyright
infringement and how it affects the music industry. I will conclude with an analysis of whether
copyright law has truly been efficient and proactive in defending artists and their music and how
it can change. Technology has fundamentally changed the way people interact with each other
and the world around them, but it has particularly altered the relationship between individuals
and the music industry, as well as the music industry itself. The technological advancements of
the 21st century are virtually irreversible, thus it is the job of all the other industries affected by
them to constantly adapt and accommodate for the proliferation of illicit practices. Whether the

1

In the context of Napster and other music sharing software, a peer-to-peer network is one in which individual
users are connected to each other via software for the purpose of downloading and sharing music with each other.
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copyright legal industry has successfully remained toe-to-toe with music piracy and the digital
programs associated with it is the main focus of this paper. Hopefully that consensus will then
foster thoughtful discussions about the changing technological environment and both the positive
and negative effects it has had on music copyrights.
History of Music Copyright Law
Early Beginnings of Music Copyright Law
To be able to fully discuss the efficiency of music copyright law in preventing and
combating the effects of illegal music sharing, a historical survey of the evolution of music
copyright law in the United States is necessary for context. According to the U.S Copyright
Office, the first copyright law in the U.S was introduced in 1790, but it was very limited in
nature and did not cover music in its protection; it wasn’t until 1831 that musical compositions
became protected by copyright law. Eventually, copyright law began to expand more not only in
its legal protection of music but in the enforcement of these laws as well. In 1897, a law
prohibiting unauthorized music performances without a copyright was introduced and a few
years later, in 1914, the ASCAP, or the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers, was created (U.S Copyright Office, 2016). The ASCAP was, and remains, a strong
advocate for the copyright protection of music and for the protection of artists’ rights.
In 1917, Herbert v. Shanley Co. paved the way for ASCAP to invest in and enforce
official music licensing (ASCAP, 2014). In 1916, a songwriter called Victor Herbert sued
Shanley’s Restaurant in NYC for playing his copyrighted dramatico-musical composition2
without paying him any royalties or even informing the artist of the fact the restaurant would be
playing his music (Herbert v. Shanley Co., 1916). Originally, the outcome of the case was in

2

A dramatico-musical composition is “an opera, musical play or show, revue or pantomime for which the music
has been specially written” (PRS for Music, 2019)
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favor of Shanley’s Restaurant. The court stated that Herbert did not clarify that he owned the
copyright for the composition and that Herbert’s copyright of the music and lyrics from a
specific song in the composition were not violated by Shanley’s Restaurant (Herbert v. Shanley
Co., 1916). However, in 1917, the United States Supreme Court overturned the original decision
to find in favor of Herbert, stating that even if the restaurant did not intend to profit from the
music and Herbert did not state that the composition was copyrighted, Shanley’s Restaurant
violated the copyright for the composition owned by Herbert and should pay the royalties they
were supposed to have paid (Herbert v. Shanley Co., 1917). This decision allowed for more
serious attention to be awarded to music copyright enforcement and protection. Shortly
thereafter, in 1921, ASCAP cemented its efforts in legal music licensing by implementing a
blanket license. This blanket license pooled musical copyrights held by composers, authors, and
publishers, and collectively licensed the rights to use those works to different music users, such
as restaurants and radio stations, for a single fee, instead of licensing individual works to
individual music users for different fees (Herlihy & Zhang, 2016). Blanket licensing became the
popular practice for media such as TV and radio stations due to its concrete protection of artists’
rights and increased facility and rapidity in licensing for a large number of songs without
cumbersome and time-consuming individual negotiations (Herlihy & Zhang, 2016).
Modern Copyright Legal Policies
Copyright Act of 1976. At this point, change in music copyright law stagnated until
1972 when federal protection was awarded to sound records fixed after that year and the first
sound recording registrations were made (U.S Copyright Office, 2016). In 1976 came the latest
official Copyright Act to date, with the most resounding effect being the indoctrination of fair
use into the Copyright Act. According to Reyburn (2000), fair use refers to the select rights
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copyright owners have over their works and which types of uses by those who don’t hold
copyrights are permissible and not liable for accusations of infringement. In the Copyright Act of
1976, there were four factors identified that could potentially protect those who don’t hold
copyrights for a work, but exercise the select rights granted to copyright holders. The four factors
were:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work (Fair Use Doctrine, 1976).
The first factor is pretty self-explanatory; if a person who doesn’t hold a copyright for a work
shares it for profit, they would be violating the copyright holder’s select rights and could be held
liable for infringement. The second factor deals more with the concept of creative originality,
which will be explained in more detail below. The third factor references whether an entire
copyrighted work is shared, or whether only a small portion of it is. Sharing a small preview of a
song isn’t illegal, but sharing an entire song, or even just a majority of it, can be illegal. The
fourth factor concerns the financial impact that the use of the copyrighted work by those who
don’t own the copyright would have on actual copyright holders. If music was shared for free by
anyone other than the copyright holder, then the copyright holder would lose money they
could’ve had if that person/organization hadn’t shared the work for free.
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AHRA and creative originality. Jumping now to 1991, there began an explosion in
changes to music copyright law correlated with the explosive changes in technology that were
developing. In 1991, creative originality as a requirement for copyright protection of a work was
officially reinforced and properly defined as a threshold (Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., Inc., 1991). Throughout the years, originality in respect to copyright law has had
different definitions, in essence developing parallel to copyright law (Gervais, 2002). While a
single formal definition wasn’t outlined in 1991, the idea of creativity as a threshold requiring a
minimal amount of creativity for a work to be copyrighted was established (Gervais, 2002). The
creativity threshold is a double-threat, ensuring both that some degree of creativity is required to
be present for copyright protection, but also that artists and innovators don’t have to be deathly
afraid that their works aren’t wholly original. Often, complete originality might not be an
achievable goal and would just prevent the production of new works (CCC Information Services
v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 1994). One year later, royalties for artists and copyright
owners were introduced for sales of digital audio recording devices and other recording media
with the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (“AHRA”). The AHRA was a direct assault by
music copyright owners on the emerging digital recording industry because copyright owners
correctly perceived a financial threat in technology that could produce copyrighted work
independently of musicians and recording companies (Gaffney, 2000). The AHRA was the
beginning of the shaky tension between the music copyright and technology industries.
DPRSRA. On the heels of the AHRA came the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recordings Act of 1995 (“DPRSRA”) which sought to tackle Internet piracy by granting
copyright owners “the exclusive right [specifically for sound recordings] to perform the work
publicly by means of digital audio transmission” (Lubash, 1998, p. 499). In simpler terms, the act
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allowed copyright owners of sound recordings to receive royalties when people access their
sound recordings online. This means that if a program transmitted sound recordings without the
copyright owners’ permission or without compensating them, they would be in violation of the
copyright and the owner could sue for copyright infringement. While the DPRSRA was a huge
win for copyright owners, arguably the most significant win for music copyright in the 90s was
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”), which amended several issues the
DPRSRA did not properly address.
DMCA. The DMCA mainly helped in decreasing confusion between the companies
involved in the distribution of content on the Internet and copyright owners. While it is just that
copyrighted work should not be distributed without the owners’ permission and proper
compensation, it would also be unfair financially to hold every Internet Service Provider (“ISP”)
involved in helping the Internet run responsible for one program’s, or person’s, crime (Balaban,
2000). Such an action would alienate ISPs from distributing music on the Internet, which in turn
would end up hurting copyright owners as well. The DMCA’s purpose was to strike a balance
between the desires of copyright owners and ISPs by setting a restriction on which ISPs could be
held guilty of infringement and which could not. This balance took the form of four safe
harbors—Conduit Functions, System Caching, User Storage, and Information Location Tools—
which define the specific situations where an ISP might not be, or might be, held liable for
infringement (Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 1998).
As Balaban (2000) explains it, the Conduit Functions limit ensures that ISPs cannot be
held directly/primarily guilty of infringement if a program using that ISP is found to be illegally
sharing music, since it is not clear that the ISP had knowledge that such activity was taking place
or could have prevented it. The System Caching limit gives ISPs permission to make a temporary
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copy of a sound recording “to provide quicker access for its users” (Balaban, 2000, p. 319). As
long as the temporary copy is not distributed continuously to unintended users without providing
monetary compensation to the copyright owners, then the ISP couldn’t be held liable of
infringement. The User Storage limit is the most flexible in protecting ISPs against infringement
by permitting that ISPs retain an illegal copy of a sound recording, that users of the ISPs could
access, as long as they either don’t know the copy is illegal or receive no financial compensation
from it (Balaban, 2000). The Information Location Tools limit protects ISPs from copyright
infringement claims when the ISPs simply provide links to illegal sound recordings rather than
store the recordings themselves (Balaban, 2000). All four of these safe harbors allow significant
protection for ISPs from copyright infringement, but that does not mean that ISPs cannot still be
held liable if they try to justify their actions through these safe harbors and fail to meet the
requirements necessary to qualify for an exemption from liability.
The DMCA also served to spread the breadth of certain music copyrights by clarifying
performers’ sound recording copyrights and the compensation they should receive from online
transmissions of their performances. The scope of sound recording copyrights for performers,
versus the scope of other music copyrights for recording companies and for artists holding the
copyrights of lyrics/compositions, was very limited as a whole and virtually non-existent on the
Internet (Balaban, 2000). The lack of range for sound recording copyright protection and
compensation for performers on the Internet was rightfully worrying for performers as the
emerging online music industry was taking off. Others in the music industry were reaping
benefits performers couldn’t, due to confusion on what royalties performers holding sound
recording copyrights could demand and to whom those demands should be aimed at (Balaban,
2000).
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The DPRSRA attempted to provide the legal avenue through which performers could get
compensation for online transmissions of their performances, but it did not account for every
type of online transmission through which a performance could be heard or viewed (Balaban,
2000). The DPRSRA also made it too difficult for performers to sue individuals and programs
illegally transmitting their performances for compensation and resulted in performers simply not
getting the compensation they deserve for infringement of their copyrights (Balaban, 2000). The
DMCA was the federal government’s attempt to fix the problems DPRSRA did not address, or
badly addressed, and make the transition to online music sharing less burdensome both for
performers and other music copyright holders and for those involved in the Internet market.
MMA. Although more innovation in music copyright law would be expected as the world
jumped into the 21st century, the so-called Digital Age, it was only last year, 20 years after the
DMCA was enacted, that a new law was introduced and passed which would amend some of the
issues the DMCA has struggled with. The primary purpose of the 2018 Music Modernization Act
(“MMA”) signed by President Trump last October seems to be to fill in the gaps that previous
copyright laws have left unaddressed in regard to royalty distribution and federal protection.
Charap, Finkelstein, Moy, and Robinson (2019) outline the new copyright regulations under the
MMA, which include pre-1972 recordings finally being awarded federal copyright protection,
meaning copyright owners of pre-1972 recordings will be able to receive steady royalties for
online streaming of their music as copyright owners of post-1972 recordings have been
receiving. Furthermore, the MMA gives a legal backing for sound producers, engineers, and
mixers involved in the creation of a sound recording to receive a portion of the royalties that
generally all go to performers holding a sound recordings copyright by creating a process via
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which they can legally request these royalty payments if they wish to do so (Charap, Finkelstein,
Moy, & Robinson, 2019).
In seeking to organize music copyright holder information, the MMA puts into motion
the creation of a “central database to identify all of the songs (and the songwriters and publishers
of the songs)” (Charap et al., 2019, p. 11). The point of this central database is to minimize the
instances where music is shared online but information about the copyright holders is not shared
along with the music, so no royalties or fees are paid to music copyright owners despite their
music being shared (Charap et al., 2019). The central database would rectify this by ensuring that
when music is shared, even if copyright ownership information is not shared with it, the
information is easily accessible and thus royalties have to be rightfully paid. Finally, the MMA
adds a new requirement for determining future royalty rates for online transmissions: that the
Copyright Royalty Board “take into account what a ‘willing buyer’ and ‘willing seller’ would
pay” when setting a new royalty rate (Charap et al., 2019, p. 11).
The additions and changes in the MMA are targeted to benefit songwriters, publishers,
and others involved in the creation of music distributed on the Internet, as opposed to the DMCA
which was primarily targeted at ISPs. The DMCA being targeted at ISPs made sense at the time
because online music transmissions and sharing were rising in popularity. There needed to be
limits set on who could be held liable for infringement and who couldn’t so ISPs would continue
to contribute to the growth of music on the Internet (Balaban, 2000). However, in the years
ensuing, the pressing issue became less catering to ISPs than guaranteeing that the rights of
artists and publishers are being recognized and proactively protected (Chandler, 2019). The
signing of the MMA is an acknowledgement of this new pressing issue and an attempt to resolve
it at least partly.
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Court Cases Involving Music Piracy
Record Companies v. Music Piracy Programs
Napster. To properly understand how long illegal music sharing on the Internet has been
an issue, it is imperative to begin with the notorious A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (2000)
case. Napster was a music sharing program founded in 1999 by three college students which
allowed for users of the service to directly share MP3 files between each other for free through
the Internet by connecting users’ hard drives by way of Napster’s servers, creating a peer-to-peer
network (Zepeda, 2002). In December of 1999, different music publishers and companies sued
Napster, Inc. for secondary copyright infringement of their copyrighted music.
Napster Inc. attempted to label their program as an ISP and protect it by using the DMCA
Safe Harbors (A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000). As previously mentioned, ISPs are
generally protected from primary copyright infringement, as those charges would have to be
brought up against the individual (s) actually illegally sharing the files through the ISPs. Due to
the large number of users who use different ISPs, it would be very difficult to find the primary
copyright infringers and charge them. Policymakers also generally want to avoid alienating ISPs
by making them liable for peoples’ illegal activities (Balaban, 2000). To successfully use the
DMCA Safe Harbors for protection against copyright infringement, the defendant’s program,
Napster, would’ve had to fit under either of two definitions of a service provider. The definitions
are as follows:
[It must be] an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for
digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material
of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or
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received [or] a provider of online services or network access or the operator of facilities
therefore (DMCA Safe Harbors, 1998).
In simpler terms, users using Napster to share music would’ve had to be connected, and share
files, through the centralized Napster server instead of through the Internet, or Napster would’ve
had to serve as an actual ISP, instead of just an avenue for people to illegally share music with
one another.
Since Napster did not fit under either of these definitions, it could not qualify for safe
harbor protection from the DMCA. Napster Inc. also attempted to utilize the Fair Use Doctrine
from the Copyright Act of 1976, but did not qualify for the protection by the four fair use
provisions either. Napster’s sharing of copyrighted work was not nonprofit/educational, the
songs were original, copyrighted compositions shared in whole, and there seemed to be a
negative impact on copyright holders as a result of users illegally sharing music with each other
on Napster (A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 2001). Furthermore, Napster Inc. had knowledge
about the illegal sharing happening through their program and Napster was not found to have
“substantial non-infringing use,” meeting the requirements for contributory secondary copyright
infringement (Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 1984). Napster Inc.
also met the requirements for vicarious secondary copyright infringement because they
facilitated such illegal sharing for financial gain. To establish the requirement of financial gain,
the U.S Supreme Court drew upon the definitions of financial gain in previous similar cases such
as Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. (1996), where the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated that it would “impo[se] vicarious liability on the operator of a business where
infringing performances enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential customers.” This
definition of financial gain does not necessarily require actual monetary gain. Based on a lack of
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qualification for the DMCA Safe Harbors and Fair Use Doctrine, as well as the contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement claims, Napster was thus legally prohibited from allowing its
users to participate in illegal music sharing/distribution, leading to its eventual demise (A&M
Records v. Napster, Inc., 2001).
In an explanation for the calculation of damages in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com,
Inc. (2000), a case similar to Napster Inc.’s, the court stated that:
Some of the evidence in this case strongly suggests that some companies
operating in the area of the Internet may have a misconception that, because their
technology is somewhat novel, they are somehow immune from the ordinary
application of the laws of the United States, including copyright law. They need to
understand that the law's domain knows no such limits.
The court’s strong words were, at face value, meant to serve as a warning to those seeking to
infringe copyright law, subsequently bolstered by the record companies’ crowning victory
against Napster. However, to say the victory was short-lived would be an understatement.
Napster was unusual at the time for the sheer volume of songs being shared between users and
the popularity of the program. Richard Nieva (2015) claims that “at its peak, Napster had 70
million users.” The rising popularity of music streaming on the Internet was, at once, a cause and
effect of Napster, and from its shadow have emerged countless other illegal music sharing and
downloading programs.
Grokster. Rod Smolla (2004) in his article, “You say Napster, I say Grokster,” labeled
Grokster as the “sequel to Napster”, capturing in the simplest of terms the essence of the music
sharing program and why, like its predecessor, it was ultimately shut down for copyright
infringement. Grokster was Napster’s twin in every way, but it did not have any servers that
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would contribute to users’ file sharing. In Napster’s case, even if the files did not pass through or
were retained in its servers, users still had to use the servers to find songs and connect to other
users’ hard drives. In Grokster’s case, “a user would send a file request directly to other
computers; search results were sent back to the requesting computers, and the user could then
download the desired file from a peer’s computer” (Robertson, 2014). Grokster was completely
decentralized and its creators thought this type of system would help them avoid copyright
infringement claims. If it was just users connecting with and communicating to users, with
Grokster having no part in it except for providing an outlet for communication, how could the
program possibly be held responsible?
The U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Grokster’s sentiment and
ruled in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (2004) that Grokster could not be held liable for
copyright infringement because users were not connected in any way through its servers and files
were being shared directly from computer to computer. MGM Studios appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, whose decision was the exact opposite of the lower court. In MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (2005), the United States Supreme Court reversed the Circuit
Court’s decision and determined that Grokster Ltd. was liable for vicarious copyright
infringement because, though users did not connect to each other, transfer files, or at all interact
with Grokster’s servers, Grokster Ltd. did have sufficient knowledge that their users were
illegally sharing files with each other and benefited from those illegal activities via
advertisements on their program. MGM Studios’ claim of contributory copyright infringement
was not successful because they could not prove that Grokster did not have substantial noninfringing use.
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In Grokster’s case, plausible deniability was not possible as the United States Supreme
Court was also given evidence that “the distributors [Grokster Ltd.] expressly communicated to
users the ability of the software to copy works and clearly expressed their intent to target former
users of a similar service [Napster] which was being challenged in court for facilitating copyright
infringement” (MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 2005). Grokster Ltd. not only encouraged its
users to partake in the illegal sharing of music files, but was also prepared to solicit possible
future users for the same purpose of providing a channel for those seeking to illegally download
share and music files with others. Furthermore, Grokster Ltd. profited from the illegal music
sharing happening via their program through advertisements, as previously mentioned, and thus
could be held accountable even if their servers weren’t complicit in the music sharing. Grokster
Ltd. believed the decentralization of their software would inhibit copyright holders from suing
them and allow them to skillfully skirt around copyright infringement claims, and in the lower
courts, that technicality saved them. In the Supreme Court, however, that technicality was seen
as irrelevant because Grokster’s main defense, its complete decentralization, hinged on the fact
that Grokster Ltd. would have had no way of knowing any illegal acts occurring through their
software. Evidence shown by the plaintiff in court demonstrated that Grokster Ltd. did have
knowledge of illegal acts happening on their software and, in fact, had even encouraged those
acts, making Grokster Ltd.’s main defense fall flat.
In the grand scheme of music piracy, Grokster was not wholly significant; it was neither
the first nor the last of its kind and was indicted relatively quickly. Grokster’s relevance lays in
the audacity of software developers and the delayed reactivity of copyright law. Grokster’s
existence belied the strong position the courts and music copyright holders had taken
immediately after Napster. The general hope after Napster had seemed to be that program
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developers looking to make profit out of providing a conduit for the illegal sharing of music
would get scared and remain inconspicuous for some time. Clearly, that did not happen. If
anything, software developers became more frenzied in creating these sorts of programs and
users of these programs only continued to proliferate (Robertson, 2014).
Carol Robertson (2014) in her article “The Pirates of the Internet: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios v. Grokster, Ltd.” wrote that “the studios seem to be playing a game of ‘whack-a-mole’.”
Every time a new program like Napster and Grokster pops up, the studios and record companies
give it their all to get that program removed, but another one inevitably pops up in their place.
There is no proactivity, but rather reactivity, in the actions of the courts, of copyright law, and of
studios and record companies. Copyright law is constantly on the defense which is why
programs like Grokster get the better of it, at least for a short while. The combination of the vigor
of software developers and the lethargic reactivity of copyright law make for a fatal blow to
copyright law and copyright holders and allow software like Grokster, and LimeWire, which will
be discussed next, to keep flourishing.
LimeWire. If Napster and Grokster were the start of the illegal music sharing frenzy,
LimeWire would best be categorized as the peak as well as the downfall. LimeWire was
developed in 2000, but did not take off as a program until a few years later, when its major
competitors—Napster and Grokster to be precise—were shut down, allowing for LimeWire to
become the central program people went to when they were looking to illegally download and
share music files (McIntyre, 2018). Unlike with its predecessors, it took record companies and
copyright holders several years before they caught a whiff of what LimeWire users were using
the software for and to shut down the program, meaning that LimeWire was allowed to blossom
into an online pirate behemoth unlike any other. It wasn’t until 2010 that Lime Wire LLC was
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successfully tried for its software by several record companies, the headliner being Arista
Records LLC, and by that time, Daisy Jones (2018) writes, “it had already faded into obscurity
alongside Napster.” LimeWire was allowed to survive and thrive for so long that by the time the
record companies came for the program, users themselves had already moved on. Regardless,
record companies experienced a win in Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC (2011)3. The
victory was, at the very least, the obstruction of an active threat; even if, at the time of the court
case, LimeWire wasn’t being used as heavily as in its peak years, it was still available for use.
The evidence brought against Lime Wire LLC in Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC
(2011) was solid and incontestable despite Lime Wire LLC’s copious motions to exclude
documentation and witness testimony from the case. The infringement claims brought
successfully against LimeWire were as follows: secondary copyright infringement, inducement
of copyright infringement, common law copyright infringement, and unfair competition (Arista
Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011). To prove secondary copyright infringement, it first had
to be established that LimeWire users were illegally downloading copyrighted material and thus
committing direct infringement. The facts that LimeWire users had been illegally sharing music
and that Lime Wire LLC had benefited from its users’ direct copyright infringement, through
advertising and selling of software, was unquestionable at that point in the case, leading to a
charge of vicarious copyright infringement (Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011). The
claim of contributory copyright infringement failed because Arista Records LLC and the other
plaintiffs could not prove that LimeWire had no other substantial non-infringing uses (Arista
Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011).

3

For the purpose of this paper, LimeWire refers to the program used for music piracy. Lime Wire LLC refers to the
group that developed the program LimeWire. Lime Group LLC was an investor in LimeWire also sued by Arista
Records and the other plaintiffs.
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The plaintiffs’ claim of inducement of copyright infringement is similar to the plaintiff’s
claim in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. (2005). Not only did Lime Wire LLC have
knowledge of illegal activities being carried out through their software, but they targeted
potential users uniquely interested in illegally sharing music to use their software. Furthermore,
Lime Wire LLC made committing copyright infringement through their software easy, spent
little to no time nor money on preventing such illegal acts, and made profit out of infringing
music copyrights (Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011). Through these facts, the
plaintiffs thus provided substantial evidence of their claim of inducement of copyright
infringement against Lime Wire LLC and the latter were found guilty of another crime by the
court. The claim of common law copyright infringement is because prior to the passing of the
MMA in 2018, music copyright policy for music created before 1972 was subject to the common
law of the state, in this case New York (Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011).
LimeWire infringed music copyrights created prior to 1972 and owned by Arista Records LLC,
and thus violated the New York common law on copyright infringement. The last claim made by
the plaintiffs was for unfair competition, which the U.S Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit
defines as “the taking and use of the plaintiff's property to compete against the plaintiff's own use
of the same property” (Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, 1982). By allowing the
illegal sharing of copyrighted music through their software, Lime Wire LLC used the plaintiffs’
property in competition against the plaintiffs, making profit that presumably would have been the
plaintiffs’ if users hadn’t acquired the music through LimeWire (Arista Records LLC v. Lime
Group LLC, 2011).
The significance of LimeWire in the history of illegal music sharing through the Internet
is three-fold; it was a generational and economic phenomenon unlike any other of its kind, but it

DIGITAL MUSIC PIRACY AND COPYRIGHT LAW

21

was also the end to an era. The impact LimeWire had on American youths during its years of
service has withstood time, as seen by the surge of nostalgic memes and online articles relating
to LimeWire that flooded the Internet just a year ago. Gone but not forgotten, LimeWire was
thrust back into the limelight, illuminating millennials’—most, if not all, of LimeWire’s users
belonged to the millennial generation—conflicting relationship with the program. On one hand,
it was an online Eden for those who couldn’t, or refused to, pay for music; it was an online
“treasure chest.…that made your taste yours” (Jones, 2018). On the other hand, LimeWire was
rampant with viruses and sexually explicit images and videos; Miles Klee (2018) in his article
“Why Millennials Miss LimeWire Enough to Resurrect It as a Meme” went as far as to equate
illegally downloading music from LimeWire to unprotected sex. LimeWire was the perfect mix
of teenage rebellion and delayed gratification and that, plus the incredible amount of time it
remained active, ensured the program a permanent place in the hearts and minds of an entire
generation (Klee, 2018).
As fondly as LimeWire is still remembered by millennials, the chagrin record companies
and copyright holders experienced due to the program has been equally as memorable for them.
LimeWire cost record companies like Arista Records LLC and its musicians millions, maybe
even billions, of dollars; Josh Halliday (2010) notes in his article “LimeWire shut down by
federal court,” that the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) estimated a $6.8
billion-dollar loss in music sales between 1999 and 2009 and that the association attributes that
loss to music piracy software, LimeWire being one of the most vicious culprits. However, the
death of LimeWire also paralleled the decrease in popularity of peer-to-peer networks and a
decrease in the popularity of piracy overall; possible reasons for this phenomena will be
addressed shortly.
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Record Companies v. Individual Copyright Infringers
So far, the focus has been on analyzing large-scale music piracy with the liability being
placed on the software companies who develop the programs to facilitate illegal music sharing,
but now it is imperative to shift perspectives and focus on two cases where the liability was
placed on users of programs like LimeWire instead. Due to the heavy attention placed on the
fight between record companies and software companies, individual users tend to disregard the
legal risks involved with illegally downloading and sharing music; either they think they can’t
get caught or won’t suffer substantial penalties for their actions since so many others do it as
well. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset (2011) and Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum
(2011) prove otherwise, while also shedding light on a possible contributing factor to the end of
peer-to-peer network use.
Thomas-Rasset. Jammie Thomas-Rasset was sued by Capital Records, Inc. and other
record companies for illegally downloading and sharing 24 copyrighted songs through a program
similar to Napster called Kazaa (Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 2011). Unlike in the
previous cases discussed, Thomas-Rasset was held liable for direct infringement, versus
secondary infringement, as she was personally responsible for illegally downloading and sharing
the copyrighted music. The defendant’s—Jammie Thomas-Rasset—main defense was that as a
single user of such a large music sharing community like Kazaa, her contributions to the losses
of Capital Records, Inc. were negligible. The defendant claimed that if she hadn’t distributed
those 24 copyrighted songs, someone else on Kazaa would have and hence she didn’t deserve to
be singled out and held liable for what others were doing/would have also done (Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 2011). However, Thomas-Rasset was demonstrated to be fully
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aware that her actions in downloading and sharing songs using Kazaa were illegal, which meant
she committed copyright infringement willfully, and even attempted to cover up her crime in
court by suggesting that it wasn’t her who illegally shared songs, but instead her children and exboyfriend (Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 2011). The court not only did not believe
Thomas-Rasset’s attempts to shirk blame, but also disagreed with her conclusion that as a single
user of Kazaa, she did not deserve to be held liable, finding her guilty of direct copyright
infringement. Even if others on Kazaa and on other illegal music sharing programs were also
illegally downloading and sharing music, that doesn’t make Thomas-Rasset any less liable for
the monetary damage she caused the plaintiffs; frankly, it only makes her unlucky that she was
caught.
Tenenbaum. The case of Sony BMG Music Entertainment against Joel Tenenbaum is
almost identical to Thomas-Rasset’s case. Joel Tenenbaum was a commonplace user of illegal
music sharing programs just like Thomas-Rasset, albeit more prolific as he used several different
programs over several years, including Napster, LimeWire, and Kazaa. Evidence from court
proceedings showed that “at one point in time in 2004 alone, Tenenbaum had 1153 songs on his
‘shared-directory’ on the Kazaa network;” those songs could have been downloaded by other
Kazaa users hundreds, maybe even thousands, of times, resulting in loss of money for copyright
holders (Sony BMG Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 2011). According to Sony BMG Music Entm’t
v. Tenenbaum (2011), Tenenbaum was aware that his actions were illegal and received several
warnings to stop illegally sharing music from his father, the university he attended, and his
Internet service provider, and even from Sony BMG Music Entm’t. Tenenbaum heeded none of
the warnings; in fact, even after Sony sent him a letter informing him that they were aware of his
copyright infringement and would be proceeding with charges against him, Tenenbaum
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continued to illegally share music (Sony BMG Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 2011).
Tenenbaum’s refusal to stop illegally sharing music in the context of all of the warnings given to
him was thus a deliberate and willful decision to continue to commit a crime and accept the
possible consequences that could come of it. Before the trial, Tenenbaum, like Thomas-Rasset,
attempted to shift the blame on others in his household, but ended up admitting during the trial
that his previous claims had been lies and it had in fact been him who had used different
programs to illegally download and share music (Sony BMG Entertainment v. Tenenbaum,
2011).
Thomas-Rasset and Tenenbaum were most likely not the most vicious distributors of
copyrighted music; they were just ordinary users of peer-to-peer networks who got caught up in
the struggle of music copyright holders to stem the popularity of illegal music sharing. ThomasRasset’s and Tenenbaum’s cases are every illegal music downloader’s scary bedtime story; don’t
illegally share music or you’ll get eaten by the big, bad record companies. Every case copyright
holders have brought against copyright infringers has been both to get justice for lost profits and
royalties and to deter future infringement, but in Thomas-Rasset’s and Tenenbaum’s cases, the
purpose of the lawsuit was more of the latter (Kot, 2010). Music copyright holders were growing
desperate; illegal music sharing and downloading programs were increasingly more and more of
a threat to profits and also to the intrinsic value of copyrights as a whole (Kot, 2010). If everyone
had the right to share and download music without paying, copyrights would be valueless. The
idea was that if other illegal music sharers saw regular people just like them being held liable for
copyright infringement instead of just large, successful software companies, maybe they would
think twice about their actions and refrain from illegally sharing music. It is difficult to say if
Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset (2011) or Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum (2011)
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had such an effect. The cases took place during the peak years of illegal music sharing, 20042011, and were fully resolved coincidentally when illegal music sharing began to ebb.
Musicians and Record Companies’ Positions on Music Piracy
Was the decline in illegal music sharing a result of copyright law scaring copyright
infringers into the shadows or simply a result of the passage of time and technological change? If
the answer is the former, it would mean a trophy for copyright law in its defense of copyrighted
works, but if the answer is the latter, it would mean that time has more of an effect on the decline
of copyright crime than copyright law does, which is simply unacceptable. The main question
remains: is current copyright law efficient in its protection of copyrighted works or does it
require change? The final piece to answering this question is the view of the artists and record
companies themselves. Simply put, the copyright holders are the ones who lose out the most
when copyright law isn’t at its sharpest; whether they feel that their works are being protected
properly, or not, is key to determining whether policy change is necessary and what forms this
change should take. Moreover, it is important to assess, through copyright holders’ concerns,
whether copyright infringement is a victimless crime, as many copyright infringers seem to
believe, or whether it has a tangible negative impact on copyright holders. This assessment will,
in turn, evaluate the importance of copyright policy and of changing it if the current policies are
failing to meet reasonable standards.
Musicians in Favor of Music Piracy
Pew Research Center survey. It would be fair to assume that all musicians are staunchly
against illegal music sharing. After all, the more people illegally share music, the less they buy
songs and the less profits musicians gain from their works. However, the reality of artists’
thoughts on illegal music sharing is more complex, with some artists rallying against it and
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others, if not outright approving of the act, at least not directly opposing it. The Pew Research
Center’s Internet & American Life Project, a nonprofit organization that performs research on
various different topics related to American interaction with technology, conducted a survey of
4,768 Americans, of which 809 were self-proclaimed artists, 1, 204 were general American
citizens, and 2,755 were self-proclaimed musicians, about “their opinions on digital file-sharing
and other Internet issues” (Zeller, 2004). Zeller (2004) notes the importance of this survey in
providing “the first large-scale snapshot of what the people who actually produce the goods that
downloaders seek (and that the industry jealously guards) think about the Internet and filesharing.” As previously mentioned, the focus of the effects of illegal music sharing has largely
been on the record companies, the developers of file-sharing programs and to a much smaller
extent, individual downloaders and sharers of music files, but not on musicians, which is a
grievous gap in research trying to analyze the effects of illegal music sharing.
The survey yielded several surprising results. When asked whether downloading files
from a file-sharing program should be legal or illegal, only 48% of musicians answered that it
should be illegal, with 33% answering that it should be legal and 19% not answering at all
(Zeller, 2004). What was surprising was not just that only 48% of musicians reported that
illegally downloading music should be illegal, but that the percentage survey results for that
question for the general non-artist population were almost identical to the musicians’ response.
Musicians didn’t care more or less than the general population about individuals illegally
downloading and sharing music. When asked if they believed making copies of copyrighted
material and selling them for profit should be legal or illegal, however, musicians almost
unanimously responded that it should be illegal, again on par with the results of the general
population (Zeller, 2004). The disparity between the results of the previous two survey questions
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seems to come down to the actual act of selling copyrighted material versus just downloading
and sharing it using programs like LimeWire. Even though the actual loss in profit would most
likely be equal between a person selling copyrighted music and another sharing it for free on the
Internet, the act of attempting to actively profit from the works of musicians, and hence actively
steal profits from musicians, is more easily condemnable.
On making more money, 72% of musician respondents said the Internet had some
effect—whether big or small—on higher profits, and on being able to reach a wider audience,
88% said the Internet had affected that as well. When it came to the perceived effect of piracy on
the Internet as a threat to music, however, only 37% of musicians responded that they believed
the Internet had negatively affected their ability to protect their music (Zeller, 2004). What these
results overall signify is that many musicians do not perceive illegal music sharing and
downloading as a huge threat to music and to profits and still believe in their efficacy to protect
their music, or in the effectiveness of music protection as a whole.
Individual musicians’ positive views on piracy. To put this view of illegal music
sharing as largely unthreatening into perspective, here are several instances in which generally
renown musicians talk about music piracy in a positive light. CBS News’ Mark Phillips
interviewed musician Ed Sheeran in 2010 about his then recently released album Division (“÷”)
and overall music career. In the interview, when asked about who helped his music career take
off first, Sheeran surprisingly answered that he owed the start of his stardom to his fans and file
sharing. The singer notes that:
[He] know[s] that’s a bad thing to say because [he’s] part of the music industry that doesn’t
like illegal file sharing, but illegal file sharing was what made [him]. It was students in
England going to university sharing [his] songs with each other (Sheeran, 2010).
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In an interview with talk-show host Charlie Rose, musician and leader of the group Public
Enemy Chuck D (2000) spoke in support of file sharing, saying that he viewed Napster “as just
being a version of new radio” giving power over artists back to the people, the fans, rather than
the industry being “accountant and lawyer-driven.” In an interview with The Times, Radiohead
guitarist Ed O’Brien was quoted saying:
My generation grew up with the point of view that you pay for your music. Every
generation has a different method. File sharing is like a sampler, like taping your mate’s
music. You go, ‘I like that, I’ll go and buy the album’. Or, ‘you know what, I’ll go and
see them live’ (as cited in Foster, 2009).
In that same interview with The Times, Nick Mason, the drummer for Pink Floyd, was also
quoted speaking positively about illegal music sharing and how “it’s a great thing to have
another generation discovering your music and thinking you’re rather good. File sharing plays a
part in that, because that generation don’t do it any other way” (as cited in Foster, 2009). These
musicians’ favorable views on illegal music sharing, as well as the data from The Pew Research
Center’s Internet & American Life Project’s survey previously presented, are important to
discuss because it would be biased and incorrect to only address negative views on illegal music
sharing instead of all consequential opinions, but also to note how drastic of a change is needed,
if any change at all, in current music copyright policy. In turn, it is time to shift the discussion to
the opinions of those who do perceive illegal music sharing as a huge threat, most notably record
companies, and examine why they perceive illegal music sharing so.
Record Companies Against Music Piracy
Music record companies have been illegal music sharing’s most ardent opposers since the
very beginning of illegal file sharing. Every major case battled in the past two decades against
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illegal music sharing: A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (2000), MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
Ltd. (2005), and Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC (2011), just to name a few, have all
been fought by large record companies. It is record companies who lose the most money overall
due to music piracy because they manage hundreds of artists, for many of whom their music is
being illegally downloaded and shared. The Recording Industry Association of America, or
RIAA, is an umbrella corporation housing several music recording companies; according to their
website, “nearly 85% of all legitimate recorded music produced and sold in the United States is
created, manufactured or distributed by RIAA members” (RIAA, 2019). The RIAA takes a very
serious stance against music piracy and encourages people who witness music piracy to report it
on their website as “it’s important for fans to help look out for illegal activity that damages the
creative freedom of the artists you love” (RIAA, 2019). The RIAA evidently does not agree with
the view that music piracy can have positive effects for artists; whether their disagreement stems
from greed or a genuine desire to protect artists is unclear, but inconsequential because their
monetary interests generally align with artists’. The RIAA’s concerns over the effects of illegal
music sharing on musicians are mirrored by CBM Records’ campaign, #ProtectOurFutures. In a
Forbes article, a spokesperson for the campaign was quoted saying:
What many people don’t realize is that many up and coming artists are one missed
paycheck away from homelessness. It’s already difficult for an artist to make a living
through recording, performing, and selling their works, especially independently. So how
unfair is it that they then have to turn around and worry that their music is being illegally
downloaded (as cited in Granados, 2016).
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Individual Musicians Against Music Piracy
It’s not just record companies, however, who are strictly against illegal music sharing, but
musicians as well. Perhaps the most famous case of musicians against file sharing is that of
Metallica, who were the first musicians to bring up a case in court against Napster in 2000—in
fact, they were the first band to legally address the dangers of illegal music sharing overall—
even before A&M Records and the other record companies did. Metallica not only sued Napster
Inc. through court, but its drummer, Lars Ulrich, went as far as to actually “[show] up at the
headquarters of file-sharing site Napster in May 2000 clutching the names of more than 300,000
people the band accused of illegally downloading its music [and] demanded Napster stop them”
(Sandoval, 2008). In that same interview previously mentioned with Chuck D (2000) and Charlie
Rose, Lars Ulrich (2000) was the second invitee and he took the opposite side of the argument
from Chuck D, stating that:
It’s really about control and about the future [and not about money]. [It’s about people
on the internet taking] for granted that because [the music] comes through the computer,
through the Internet, that they have a right to it. It’s a very, very dangerous position to
take.
Musician Lily Allen has also been a strong advocate against illegal music sharing, penning an
article for The Times in 2009 calling out other musicians, such as Nick Mason and Ed O’Brien,
who openly supported file sharing. Allen (2009) notes that while file sharing may have benign
effects for established musicians like Pink Floyd and Radiohead, “for new talent…file sharing is
a disaster—it makes it harder and harder for new acts to emerge.”
Most musicians, however, seem to avoid taking a strong position either against or for
illegal file sharing. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal’s D: Dive Into Media
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Conference, musician Neil Young was quoted saying that “Piracy is the new radio. That’s how
music gets around. That’s the real world for kids” (as cited in Smith, 2012). However, in that
same article, Young also defended record companies and their efforts to protect artists against
illegal music sharing. Musician Rodney Crowell said in a New York Times article:
In some ways, I think the record companies have it coming, but at the same time, being a
writer and therefore in the business of copyright, they're saying it's impacting our
business by 30 percent or more, so we have to do something (as cited in Strauss, 2003).
Neil Strauss (2003) in his article “File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in Middle” notes
that for many artists who oppose illegal music sharing the issue isn’t loss of royalties/revenue,
but rather a loss of control, a sentiment Lars Ulrich had previously expressed. The record
companies’ battle is a financial one, which makes it more black-and-white in essence. The
musicians’ dilemma, however, seems to be more focused on the creative aspect of music rather
than the financial one (Strauss, 2003). While some artists are okay with this loss of control,
others aren’t, and it would be unfair to expect all musicians, as well as record companies, to sit
back comfortably as money and control is being stolen from them.
A Remaining Need for Change
While it was surprising to see how many artists were ambivalent/uncaring about illegal
music sharing, that does not change the fact that many other artists do not feel like their music is
being protected properly (Zeller, 2004). The blame could be placed solely on copyright holders
for not being as vicious and proactive as they should be in combating illegal music sharing, but it
is unrealistic to expect copyright holders to succeed utilizing a flawed law system. Based on the
continuous existence of copyright infringing programs and activities, it is clear that copyright
law has not managed to keep up with changing technology and that current copyright policies

DIGITAL MUSIC PIRACY AND COPYRIGHT LAW

32

require change to offer the most efficient protection of music copyrights possible. Both copyright
holders and copyright policymakers have to work together to fix the current issues with
copyright law and come up with innovative ideas to launch copyrights into the 21st century. Even
if illegal music sharing isn’t as significant of a problem nowadays, thanks to programs like
YouTube and Spotify, according to a 2019 report by the International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry (“IFPI”), 23% of music consumers still obtained music through ways that
resulted in music copyright infringement. Continuing to employ reactive approaches against file
sharing software will not lower that statistic and neither will attacking individual music
consumers after they’ve engaged in copyright infringement. In the next section, a few methods
will be outlined concerning suggestions by experts in music copyright law of how the law can
evolve to either accommodate or further reduce music piracy, as well as other methods outside of
the law that could be used in conjunction with changes to copyright law.
Combating Music Piracy
Ideas for combating illegal music downloading and sharing vary in their radicality and
invasiveness on everyday life. As a disclaimer, there are no guarantees that any of these methods
will have a stronger effect than programs like Spotify and YouTube have already had on
decreasing music copyright infringement, but they’re an effort to give copyright holders a
fighting chance and to fix certain issues that are restricting music copyright law from reaching its
most efficient form. The methods that have a strong chance of being effective are reforming the
AHRA and the Copyright Act of 1976’s Fair Use Doctrine, creating a tax for certain products
that facilitate illegal music sharing and downloading, legalizing free music downloading and
sharing as long it’s not for profit, informing music consumers more accurately about what is
legal and what is not legal when it comes to music consumption as well as about the effects of

DIGITAL MUSIC PIRACY AND COPYRIGHT LAW

33

illegally sharing and downloading music, and implementing blockchain technology into the
music industry.
Reforms to AHRA and Fair Use Doctrine. Wagman and Kopp (2006) were the main
proponents of reforms to the AHRA and the Fair Use Doctrine. As a reminder, the AHRA
introduced royalties for artists and copyright owners for sales of digital audio recording devices
and other recording media (U.S Copyright Office, 2016). Wagman and Kopp (2006) proposed
revising the AHRA by:
(1) Broadening the definition of “digital audio recording devices" to include all computer
and computer-like devices, including any devices which are able to receive or record
audio and devices possessing a hard drive;
(2) Increasing the royalty payment imposed on the importation, manufacture and
distribution of such devices to two-and-one-half percent (2.5%); and
(3) Eliminating the distinctions between devices that are only partly digital audio
recording devices and those which are only digital audio recording devices.
Expanding the definition of digital audio recording devices and increasing the royalty payments
for manufacturers and distributors of such devices will vastly increase revenue for copyright
holders from royalties, which will help offset the loss of revenue from copyright infringement.
Wagman and Kopp (2006) argue that even though a computer’s main purpose is not for use as a
digital audio recording device, which is why it was originally not included in the definition for
digital audio recording devices under the AHRA, many music consumers end up using
computers and computer-like devices for the purpose of illegally downloading and sharing music
and just listening to music overall. This, thus, becomes an argument between theory and practice.
In theory, a computer’s main purpose would not be to act as a digital audio recording device, but
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in practice, it is highly likely that computers would be frequently used for this purpose. Wagman
and Kopp (2006) are proposing that the AHRA’s definition of digital audio recording devices
focus on actual practice rather than theory.
As for modifications to the Fair Use Doctrine, Wagman and Kopp (2006) recommend
adding a Compulsory Fair Use License (“CFUL”) which, without a copyright holder’s explicit
permission to share or downloaded their copyrighted works, would subject ‘fair users’ to pay
royalties at a reduced price for a certain period of time, after which the ‘fair user’ is free to use
and distribute the material as they wish. The same four factors that have up to this point
determined eligibility for being classified as a ‘fair user’, and receiving the protections of that
classification thereof, would still be applied for determining if a user qualifies for a CFUL, but
that classification would be established before any court proceedings that might take place,
saving time and money for both plaintiffs and defendants in copyright infringement suits, and
ensuring that the Fair Use Doctrine can’t be abused by copyright infringers of any kind. These
new royalty payments, though not as substantial as other royalty payments may be, would still
mean more revenue coming in for copyright holders that wouldn’t have otherwise come in, as
well as less money being hemorrhaged out in court cases to prove/disprove ‘fair use’ claims.
NUL. In the stratagem of raising more revenue to accommodate for monetary loss due to
illegal music sharing and downloading, Neil Netanel proposes creating a Noncommercial Use
Levy (“NUL”) which would be “imposed on the sale of any consumer product or service whose
value is substantially enhanced by P2P file sharing” (Netanel, 2003). Netanel (2003) envisions
the NUL being applied to not just providers of P2P software, but also to ISPs and
sellers/manufacturers of “computer hardware…, and consumer electronic devices… used to
copy, store, perform, or transmit digital files.” Netanel’s (2003) plan goes beyond Wagman and
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Kopp’s (2006) suggested reforms to the AHRA by also including ISPs, which, to date, have not
been expected to pay royalties of any kind.
Legalizing free music downloading and sharing. Jared Welsh (2008) recommends a
different approach to battling music piracy: simply making free downloading and sharing
completely legal, so long as its for noncommercial uses. Welsh (2008) claims that legalizing
noncommercial free downloading and sharing would be beneficial for ordinary users because it
would provide a legal and expansive method of accessing music they might’ve otherwise
accessed through illegal methods, effectively preventing them from committing a crime. More
controversially, he argues, it would also be beneficial for musicians and record companies.
Welsh (2008) argues that musicians would not heavily feel the loss of revenue from sound
recording copyrights since most of their revenue comes from concerts and merchandise sales
anyway; in fact, musicians might profit from more exposure to their music if their music
becomes easily accessible online for free. As for record companies, they would just have to find
a way to “compete with free products by providing better access to better products…., plac[ing]
the burden of preventing real free-riding on the only entities that suffer from the problem, which
are the very ones with sufficient capital to do so” (Welsh, 2008, p. 1533).
Warning and informing music consumers. Better information and warnings to music
consumers could potentially further decline illegal music sharing and downloading. Ullman and
Silver (2018) conducted an experiment to test the efficacy of different types of warnings related
to copyright infringement specifically directed at music consumers. The researchers claim that
current anti-piracy warnings are vague, complex, and may not be as effective because they’re not
individualized to target the different types of piracy, i.e., music piracy, literature piracy, etc.
(Ullman & Silver, 2018). Out of all the warnings tested, participants rated the warning including
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an image of a computer, a down arrow to symbolize downloading above the computer, a slash
across the image of the computer and down arrow to symbolize that the action is illegal, either
the words ‘stop’ or ‘important’, and the phrase ‘This is illegal. You may be monitored and you
may be fined’ as the most effective out of all the warnings (Ullman & Silver, 2018). Ullman and
Silver (2018) also noticed a peculiarity in the response to downloading versus uploading
(sharing) warning symbols, where downloading warning symbols were seen as more
representative of a warning against copyright infringement than uploading warning symbols. The
researchers attributed this peculiarity to lack of knowledge among music consumers that
uploading music, aka sharing music, even having acquired it through legal means, without a
copyright holder’s consent, is as illegal as downloading music without a copyright holder’s
consent. More effective warnings coupled with providing music consumers with more
comprehensive information about what is legal and illegal when it comes to music consumption,
as well as explaining the impact of such illegal actions on the music industry, may have a very
positive impact on decreasing illegal music sharing and downloading. However, more effective
warnings and information would best be used as supplements to policy change and/or
technological innovations to prevent piracy, rather than as a main, sole deterrent.
Blockchain. Blockchain technology was originally developed to be used with the online
cryptocurrency Bitcoin, but the principles and the technology behind it also have a lot of
potential in other industries such as the music industry. Blockchain functions as a decentralized
peer-to-peer network created to cut out middlemen in transactions and afford users a more
secure, streamlined method of participating in transactions, whether they are buying or selling a
product or creating a contract (Biscontini, 2019). A blockchain transaction begins when a person
requests to start a transaction on a specific blockchain network. The request for the transaction is
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then analyzed, to confirm if the transaction is valid and legal, by all other computers on that
same specific blockchain network (Botjes, 2017). If the transaction is validated, the other person,
the recipient of the transaction, receives whatever was being transacted and the transaction
becomes a block which is then locked. The block then becomes part of the blockchain, of the
network, and it is purportedly virtually impossible to erase or modify (Botjes, 2017). Blockchain
is often identified as a digital ledger and that description best reveals how it can contribute to the
music industry and reduce piracy: by providing complete transparency for artists and protection
against the sabotage of transactions (McGrath, 2019).
The music industry can utilize blockchain to reduce piracy by tracking when users
illegally upload music. To give an example, Vevue is a music streaming program that runs on
blockchain technology. According to Vevue’s founder Thomas Olson, with the help of
blockchain, “if someone copies content tracked by our technology by any possible means,
including videoing or recording a screen, our platform will be able to identify the owner of the
device/system where the content was last played” (Olson as cited in Delgado, 2019). Blockchain
technology would provide a way to keep track of the surveillance data (Delgado, 2019). This
surveillance data would prevent illegal music sharing, therefore preventing illegal music
downloading. Another way to track users utilizing blockchain technology is by placing digital
watermarks on music purchases as the company CustosTech has done. Through this digital
watermark created using blockchain technology, CustosTech can “analyze the watermark for that
file to determine who the legal recipient of the file was” if they learn the file has been illegally
shared or downloaded (Delgado, 2019). If people knew they could be easily traced for sharing
music illegally and have a lawsuit brought against them, it might prevent or further reduce
piracy.
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Blockchain technology could also be implemented into already existing streaming
programs to facilitate royalty distributions via smart contracts. Smart contracts are computer
protocols within a blockchain network that automatically perform a transaction when the
agreements of a contract are met; the individuals involved in the transaction only have to be sure
that they meet the terms of the contract (Frankenfield, 2019). In the case of the music industry,
smart contracts would benefit musicians the most as they could negotiate royalty contracts
through blockchain, ensuring that musicians can receive more profits from royalties than they
normally do. According to Bazinet et al. (2018), in 2017, musicians received only 12% of the
revenue incurred by the music industry, “with most of the value leakage driven by the costs of
running a myriad of distribution platforms—AM/FM radio, satellite radio, Internet distributors—
augmented by the costs (and profits) of the record labels” (p. 3). Moreover, there are several
problems with the current system of royalty payments that could be ameliorated, if not solved, by
the use of smart contracts through blockchain to automate the process of royalty payments
(Butler, 2018).
Incorporating blockchain technology into the music industry either through the methods
mentioned above or through other innovative ways has the potential to both decrease the current
levels of music piracy and accommodate financially for the losses caused by music piracy that
continue to persist. Moreover, blockchain could be key in bridging the divide between copyright
law and technology in the music industry as a result of constant conflict. Since copyright law
would still be essential in controlling and monitoring the use of blockchain technology so the
technology isn’t adopted for the purpose of illegal practices, adopting blockchain technology
could result in harmony and cooperation between the fields of technology and copyright law
rather than strife.
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Conclusion
Ameliorating the effects of illegal activity because of deficiencies in our copyright law
system is certainly possible, through the methods mentioned in this paper or through other
measures, but it appears to be too late to return to a world without pirating as record companies
and other copyright holders have been wishing. This impossibility does not negate the positive
effects of copyright and intellectual property law overall and should not discourage policymakers
from coming up with more innovative ways for copyright holders to maintain control over their
works, though that control may look very different than it has historically. The fact that change is
needed in our current copyright law system as a result of piracy is indisputable, regardless of the
different ideas people have about how that change should look. As long as the weapons of choice
for battling copyright infringement continue to be vague threats and crackdowns on file sharing
and downloading programs after they’ve already achieved popularity, music copyright
infringement will persist.
Policymakers are certainly heading in the right direction with the ratification of the MMA
for improving the quality of copyrights, but that policy does not address illegal file downloading
and sharing. When change regarding copyright infringement through file sharing and
downloading programs comes, it’ll be vital that not only record companies and policymakers
participate in the conversation about what changes to implement, but also musicians and
informed music consumers. The parties most affected by copyrights either directly or indirectly
should get a voice and a chance to put forth ideas that would benefit them and others like them.
Through this collaboration, music copyright law can evolve to reach a new level of efficiency
and success in the protection of copyright holders and their creations and reduce the damaging
effects of copyright infringement through file sharing and downloading programs.
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